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SOCIAL MANEUVERS AND THEORY OF
MIND
DAVID SALLY*
Our social lives are distinguished by specific maneuvers-the white lie,
the bluff, the fantasy, the hint, the apology, the outburst, the ironic remark, the
faux pas. Most adults perform, interpret, and anticipate these interpersonal
maneuvers with such ease that we are rarely cognizant of the underlying,
enabling mental capacity, a capacity that has been named Theory of Mind
(ToM). Those of us with children know, however, that we must be wary of
sarcasm for fear of misinterpretation, must be explicit because indirect
commands are often ineffectual, must decipher playground episodes or
cinematic dramas that seem senseless to young minds, and must muffle the
honesty of a toddler when a friend and host who burned the meat and
overcooked the vegetables asks, "How's your dinner?" Parental experience
coincides with scientific research on ToM that has discovered that this
capability normally is innate and develops throughout childhood, and that this
developmental path sometimes goes awry and sometimes proceeds faster and
farther.
Because social maneuvering is fundamental to most negotiations, anyone
studying bargaining should be interested in the advances developmental
psychologists, animal behaviorists, and cognitive neuroscientists have made in
understanding ToM. I will summarize some of these findings here, and my
intention, discemable if you apply your ToM, is to intrigue the reader enough
that a cross-disciplinary conversation will begin and continue into the
foreseeable future.
I. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT TOM?
Theory of mind seems to be a wondrous ability. It seems to be ESP
without the invisible brain waves, communing through the ether without the
mysticism, divination without the crystal ball. That we can read the contents
of someone's mind-her intentions, emotions, wants, beliefs-with an
accuracy significantly greater than guessing is rather remarkable. However,
ToM has both mundane cognitive roots and non-human manifestations. In
fact, the phrase "theory of mind" was first used in an article describing
" Ph.D. University of Chicago; A.B. Harvard.
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chimpanzees' abilities to perceive the intentions behind various actions.'
One comprehensive model of the mundane roots of ToM is that advanced
by Andrew Meltzoff and Alison Gopnik. They suggest that the human brain
is endowed with "a fundamental cross-modal representational system that
connects self and other.",3  This innate cognitive ability is manifest in an
amazing finding: neonates as young as forty-five minutes old are able to
differentially imitate facial expressions.4 If you stick your tongue out at them,
they will try to razz you back; if you make an "0" mouth at them, they will
ogle their lips back at you. Imitation is the cornerstone that supports other
developmental milestones: At nine months, infants point, grunt, scream and
generally try to guide the intentions of other people;5 at eighteen months,
toddlers understand that other people may want things that they do not;6 at
twenty-four months, children are pretending, a cognitive activity that calls for
multiple mental states; 7 at thirty months, they can take the other's visual
perspective, recognizing that an object may be visible to them but hidden
from another person in the room.
8
Finally, by about the age of four, young children can lie. 9 Or, at least,
1. See David Premack & Guy Woodruff, Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?, 1
BEHAV. & BRAIN ScI. 515 (1978).
2. See ALISON GOPNIK & ANDREW N. MELTZOFF, WORDS, THOUGHTS, AND THEORIES
(1997).
3. Id. at 129; see also HENRY M. WELLMAN, THE CHILD'S THEORY OF MIND (1990).
4. See Andrew N. Meltzoff & M. Keith Moore, Imitation of Facial and Manual Gestures by
Human Neonates, 198 SCI. 75-78 (1977); Andrew N. Meltzoff & M. Keith Moore, Newborn Infants
Imitate Adult Facial Gestures, 54 CHILD DEV. 702, 702-09 (1983); Andrew N. Meltzoff & M. Keith
Moore, Imitation in Newborn Infants: Exploring the Range of Gestures Imitated and the Underlying
Mechanisms, 25 DEV. PSYCHOL. 954 (1989).
5. See ELIZABETH BATES ET AL., THE EMERGENCE OF SYMBOLS: COGNITION-
COMMUNICATION IN INFANCY (1979).
6. In one study, babies watched a grown-up point to one of two plates that were piled with
crackers or broccoli, and then "mrnmm" or "eeewwww." The grown-up would then hold out her
hand. Toddlers "gave her broccoli when she had previously expressed a desire for the broccoli and
crackers when she expressed a desire for crackers, despite their own unalterable conviction that
broccoli is yucky." GOPNIK & MELZOFF, supra note 2, at 150. For the study, see Betty M.
Repacholi and Alison Gopnik, Early Reasoning About Desires: Evidence from 14- and 18- Month
Olds, 33 DEV. PSYCHOL. 12 (1977).
7. See Alan M. Leslie, Pretense and Representation: The Origins of "'Theory of Mind," 94
PSYCHOL. REV. 4124 (1987); Peter Carruthers, Autism as Mind-Blindness: An Elaboration and
Partial Defense, in THEORIES OF THEORIES OF MIND 265 (Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith eds.,
1996) ("You cannot enjoy supposing or imagining without being conscious of your (mental) activity.
In general, enjoying Xing presupposes awareness ofXing-which is why you cannot enjoy digestion,
sleepwalking, or subliminal perception.") (emphasis in original).
8. See John H. Flavell et al., Young Children's Knowledge About Visual Perception: Further
Evidence for the Level 1-Level 2 Distinction, 17 DEV. PSYCHOL. 99 (1981).
9. See Beate Sodian et al., Early Deception and the Child's Theory of Mind: False Trails and
Genuine Markers, 62 CHILD DEV. 468 (1992).
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they can do the next best thing-pass false belief tests. These tests have
become well known as critical assessments of ToM and so, it is worth
describing them in more detail.' 0 The Sally-Anne tasks and its variants use
two dolls to portray a little drama for an audience of one very young
participant." The scene opens with Sally and Anne busily playing in a room.
Sally has a ball that she places in a nearby basket and covers with a blanket.
She skips out of the room. Anne, for whatever nefarious or benevolent
reason, gets up and switches the ball from the basket to a box. She recovers
the basket, folds closed the flaps of the box and returns to her activity. Sally
skips back into the room and the scene freezes. The. child is asked, "Where
will Sally look for her ball?" Very young children will answer, "the box," but
by the age of four, most children will correctly answer, "the basket."
Children three years old and younger have a difficult time distinguishing
between what they know to be true and what someone else believes. This fact
is supported by another false belief task, this one centered on a brightly
colored tin covered with pictures of delicious candy-coated chocolates.12 The
participating child is asked, "What do you think is in here?" and she responds
quite naturally with "CANDY!" Much to her disappointment, the child is
shown that the tin actually contains pencils. To try her patience further, the
child is asked, "What did you think was in here?" and "What would another
child think is in here?" Little toddlers, but not preschoolers, will fail this test
as well by replying "pencils" to both questions.
Both of these tasks involve first-order beliefs, i.e., knowing what someone
else knows. It is possible to test second-order beliefs as well. For instance,
suppose Sally peeked unseen into the room while Anne moved the ball, now
where does Anne think that Sally thinks the ball is? Not surprisingly, the
four-year-old mind that can comfortably handle the two tasks above cannot
decipher second-order belief situations. 13 In one test, after all age groups
succeeded at a first order false belief test, only 71% of six year olds passed a
second order false belief test, while 94% of eight year olds and 100% of ten
10. The test was first invented by Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner. See Heinz Wimmer &
Josef Perner, Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in
Young Children's Understanding of Deception, 13 COGNITION 103, 103-28 (1983). A meta-analysis
of published false belief tests is contained in Nurit 0. Yirmiya et al., Meta-Analyses Comparing
Theory of Mind Abilities of Individuals with Autism, Individuals with Mental Retardation, and
Normally Developing Individuals, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 283 (1998).
11. This version is from SIMON BARON-COHEN, MINDBLINDNESS (1995).
12. See Josef Perner et al., Exploration of the Autistic Child's Theory of Mind: Knowledge,
Belief and Communication, 60 CHILD DEV. 689 (1989).
13. See Kate Sullivan et al., Preschoolers Can Attribute Second-Order Beliefs, 30 DEV.
PSYCHOL. 395 (1994).
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year olds passed. 14 As the presented stories become more complicated (while
still remaining true to life), only elementary school children and older can
easily decipher tales involving double-bluffs or sarcasm, and only middle
school children and older can reliably understand a faux pas. 15
Autistic children lag behind their normally developing peers to a
significant extent with respect to performance on false belief tests.16 In the
study reported above, a group of autistic participants whose average age was
ten was tested alongside the normal six-, eight- and ten-year olds. Only two-
thirds of the autistic children (as compared to all of the control group)
correctly answered the Sally-Anne task and just over half could interpret a
second-order false belief story. 17 Many scientists now believe that the core
deficit of autism is an impaired ToM: in one poignant neologism, the autistic
person is "mindblind."' 8  Mindblindness causes autistic people to have a
variety of behavioral divergences from the norm:
A list of commonplace behaviors that are absent in autism would
include the following: interpreting facial expressions; choosing
appropriate gifts (cat litter deodorizer and strawberry jam); responding
to hints in conversation; improvising chit-chat; supplying missing
information to the audience; engaging in spontaneous pretend play;
keeping secrets; enjoying fiction; reacting actively to another's
distress or joy; forming reciprocal friendships.' 9
Autists have a colder, more objective view of social interaction. One very
famous tool used to prompt social interpretation is a film clip of abstract
14. See E.H. Hill & David Sally, The Development of Interpersonal Strategy: Autism, Theory-
of-Mind, Cooperation and Fairness (2004) (unpublished manuscript at Goldsmiths College, Univ. of
London).
15. For double bluffs, see Francesca G. Happ6, An Advanced Test of Theory of Mind
Understanding of Story Characters' Thoughts and Feelings by Ahle Autistic, Mentally Handicapped,
and Normal Children and Adults, 24 J. AUTISM & DEV. DISORDERS 129 (1994). For faux pas, see
Simon Baron-Cohen et al., Recognition of Faux Pas by Normally Developing Children and Children
with Asperger Syndrome or High-Functioning Autism, 29 J. AUTISM & DEV. DISORDERS 407 (1999)
(An example of a toe-curling faux pas story: Jill had just moved into a new apartment. Jill went
shopping and bought some new curtains for her bedroom. When she had just finished decorating the
apartment, her best friend Lisa came over. Jill gave her a tour of the apartment and asked "how do
you like my bedroom?" "Those curtains are horrible," Lisa said, "I hope you're going to get some
new ones.").
16. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
17. Hill & Sally, supra note 14.
18. BARON-COHEN, supra note 11.
19. David Sally, Into the Looking Glass: Discerning the Social Mind Through the Mindblind,
18 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 99, 108 (2001) (internal citations omitted); see also Uta Frith et
al., Autism and Theory of Mind in Everyday Life, 3 Soc. DEV. 108 (1994).
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geometric figures in motion.20 Normal individuals watch a clip and respond
with such statements as, "The big triangle got jealous of them, came out, and
started to pick on the smaller triangle. The little triangle got upset and said
like 'What's up?"'' 2 1 Autistic individuals react with the literal, physical truth:
"The big triangle went out. The shapes bounce off each other. The small
circle went inside the rectangle .... The small triangle and the circle went
around each other a few times. They were kind of oscillating around each
other, maybe because of a magnetic field.
22
A subsequent comparison of the brain scans of "mindseeing" individuals
who viewed the moving geometric figure clip with those of autistic
individuals, revealed increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and the
superior temporal sulcus in the former group.23 A variety of studies have
confirmed that these two regions are critical to the neural network supporting
ToM. 24 The medial prefrontal cortex includes areas activated in monitoring
the self s inner states. Damage to this area in normal individuals causes both
poor performance in false belief tests and behavioral problems akin to those in
autism. 25 The second region, the superior temporal sulcus, is associated with
the perception and interpretation of movements by living creatures, especially
their eyes, hands, and mouths.26 Hence, the neuroscientific evidence is
broadly consistent with the ToM developmental story above-that there is an
equivalence between the self's inner states and those of the other and that
perceiving and reacting to the face, the eyes, and the mouth in particular are
foremost.
II. WHAT DOES TOM HAVE TO DO WITH NEGOTIATIONS?
At this point, we might seem very far afield and a reader might
20. See Fritz Heider & Marianne Simmel, An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior, 57
AM. J. PSYCHOL. 243 (1944).
21. A. Klin et al., Theory of Mind in Action: Developmental Perspectives on Social
Neuroscience, in UNDERSTANDING OTHER MINDS: PERSPECTIVES FROM DEVELOPMENTAL
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 363 (Simon Baron-Cohen et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000).
22. Id. at 363-64.
23. See Fulvia Castelli et al., Autism, Asperger Syndrome and Brain Mechanisms for the
Attribution of Mental States to Animated Shapes, 125 BRAIN 1839 (2002).
24. See Uta Frith & C.D. Frith, Development and Neurophysiology of Mentalising, 358 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC'Y. B. (BIOLOGICAL Sci.) 435 (2003).
25. See Carol Gregory et al., Theory of Mind in Patients with Frontal Variant Frontotemporal
Dementia andAlzheimer's Disease: Theoretical and Practical Implications, 125 BRAIN 752 (2002).
26. See A. Puce & David Perrett, Electrophysiology and Brain Imaging of Biological Motion,
358 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC'Y. B. (BIOLOGICAL SC.) 435 (2003); Mark Sabbagh
& Marjorie Taylor, Neural Correlates of Theory-of-Mind Reasoning: An Event-Related Potential
Study, II PSYCHOL. Sci. 46 (2000).
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legitimately ask me, "What are you thinking?" The connection between ToM
and negotiation is, at once, obvious and unspecified. As we have seen, an
advanced ToM is necessary to accurately decipher social situations involving
false beliefs, bluffs, faux pas, and misrepresentation. What social situation is
more rife with these elements than negotiations? ToM must be essential to
negotiations, as it is to all normal social interactions. The mindblindness and
behavioral problems of autistic individuals reveal what "mindseeing" does for
the rest of us:
[A]utism proves that a theory of mind and the sympathetic process
are, simultaneously and inextricably, essential to language, play,
interaction, cohesion, imagination and strategy .... [T]he choice of an
optimal strategy is linked to the sharing of a smile or a touch, and to
speaking through hints, metaphors and jokes.27
There is an essential thread, then, that connects all social maneuvers,
including those in negotiations, and ties them to ToM and its associated neural
system.
This deep and broad connection disguises a host of specific questions that
have not yet been addressed by negotiation researchers. However, given the
pace of discovery in social neuroscience, it is likely that in the next decade
students of negotiations will be taught the answers to the following intriguing
questions:
Do imaging studies confirm that the ToM neural system is active
during negotiations? If so, do the patterns of activity vary with
the stage of negotiations or with the level of conflict? Are there
neural patterns that are correlated with more effective bargaining?
Among other purposes (some of which are discussed below), this
knowledge could be used as a diagnostic screen. For example, a
client might ask various lawyers, who are vying to represent her at
an upcoming negotiation, to submit a recent brain scan.
* Is there a link between ToM capabilities and specific negotiation
tactics? For example, one might find that people who do poorly
on a faux pas recognition test are more likely to: (1) make a
highball or lowball offer to a counterpart with a very strong
BATNA; (2) fail to confront and counter an opponent's extreme
offer. Are those who are more accurate mindreaders better able to
27. Sally, supra note 19, at 101.
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frame their proposals?
* Are there tests in other behavioral domains that are predictive of
negotiation success? If figurative language relies on ToM, then
accuracy in interpreting metaphors might be correlated with
negotiation skill. Are fiction readers better negotiators than
newspaper readers? How about those who give individualized
gifts during the holidays versus those who give cash or gift
certificates?
* Is there a link between ToM and broad negotiation capabilities?
One might imagine that mentalising is more useful in value
creation, but a certain social remove is effective in value claiming.
For example, a used car salesman might want a limited ToM in
order to avoid anticipating or perceiving the negative emotions of
a customer who overpays for a clunky, poorly maintained lemon.
However, one could see the relationship going in the other
direction, as the next question proposes.
* Is ToM responsible for negotiators' emotional entanglements and
indirectness about interests and values? One explanation of the
geometric film clip interpretations is that autistics see what is
there, while normal people are confabulating. "Normals"
have a hair-trigger on their ToMs: they can find intention,
emotion, and belief in the casual, chaotic heap of animal
entrails, the stochastic, stress-induced sliding of the plates
in the Earth's crust, a blinking shadow cast diagonally
through the trees by a passing cloud on a moonlit night, or
an ant dragging an oversized crumb up and over, up and
over, up and over a series of little twigs and stones.
28
Attributing intentions to every move in a negotiation may be
exhausting, frustrating, and detrimental. Sometimes, a mistake
is just a mistake, a bluff should just be ignored and forgotten,
and apologies are just a waste of time.
Just as the very young or autistic viewers imputed to Sally
their own knowledge of where her ball was located, a
28. Id. at 110 (internal citation omitted).
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negotiator may know her interests so vividly that she
automatically assumes the other side knows. Think about the
times you have had a catchy, yet sadly untitled, tune playing in
your head. You turn to a significant other and say, "What's
the name of that song? You know, the one that goes. . . ," and
then you hum or tap a few bars. The other looks at you in
puzzlement and you stare in disbelief that he or she cannot
recognize it. 29  Autistics certainly are much more literal in
their use of language; might this literalness extend into the
continuum of ToM capabilities? If so, these people might be
much more forthright and direct about their interests in a
negotiation, while the rest of us assume that the other side
knows what we want.
Is ToM the missing factor that explains differences in negotiation
process and outcomes among different occupations and by
gender? Recently, a group of researchers created a self-
administered survey that measured the degree to which a normal
adult had traits associated with autism, i.e., the person's Autistic-
Spectrum Quotient (AQ).3° When they gave the survey to
students at Cambridge University, they found a significant
difference between the AQs of those in the sciences and the AQs
of students in the social sciences and humanities. Specifically,
science students, those studying mathematics in particular, had
much higher AQs on average and thus, were closer to the autistic
end of the scale than their liberal arts counterparts were.
Furthermore, among all students, men scored slightly, but
significantly, higher than women.
These findings might extend into negotiations. Do
engineers, mathematicians, and scientists negotiate differently
than philosophers, poets, and marketers? Are gender
differences in areas such as initiating negotiations and asking
for better offers really being driven by different mentalising
capabilities? 3
1
29. See Raymond S. Nickerson, How We Know-and Sometimes Misjudge-What Others
Know: Imputing One's Own Knowledge to Others, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 737 (1999).
30. See Simon Baron-Cohen et al., The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ): Evidence from
Asperger Syndrome/High-Functioning Autism, Males and Females, Scientists and Mathematicians,
31 J. AUTISM & DEV. DISORDERS 5 (2001).
31. A recent report on gender differences is LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN
DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003). The argument that autism reflects
broader cognitive divergence between men and women has been made by Simon Baron-Cohen. See
SIMON BARON-COHEN, THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE MALE AND FEMALE
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" Does age improve both ToM and negotiating outcomes? It is
clear from our review above that ToM improves throughout
childhood. The two published studies that have examined the
performance of senior citizens on mentalising tasks contradict
each other-one found that seventy year olds were better than
twenty-one year olds, while students outperformed the elderly in
the other study.32 Of course, negotiation research has done a poor
job in general of examining bargaining behavior in the years
between graduation and the nursing home.33  Accordingly,
analysis of the latter three-quarters of the life span would benefit
both fields. Future knowledge about ToM and age will guide law
firms in deciding, for instance, whether to send senior partners or
junior associates to the bargaining table.
* What are the situational influences on ToM? Are normal people
occasionally mindblind? It seems possible, for example, that very
strong emotions or great social distance might suffice to make the
other's mind imperceptible. Our enemies tend to not only be
"bad," "strange," and "unlikable," but they seem utterly
unfathomable to us as well. One could also imagine that
hierarchy might prevent mindseeing both upwards and
downwards. If this temporary clouding does occur, the bargaining
table is as likely a setting as any other, and this may explain why
negotiations between enemies or with an organization are
significantly more difficult than other conflict-filled situations.
* It is possible that within the next decade or two cosmetic
neurosurgery and advanced neuropharmacology may be able to
enhance ToM or correct mentalising deficits? What impact will
these interventions have on negotiations and negotiators and the
intertwining minds they bring to the table?
BRAIN (2003).
32. See Francesca G. Happd et al., The Getting of Wisdom: Theory of Mind in Old Age, 34 DEV.
PSYCHOL. 358 (1998); Elizabeth A. Maylor et al., Does Performance on Theory of Mind Tasks
Decline in Old Age?, 93 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 465 (2002).
33. This same critique has been leveled at all experimental research in the social sciences. See
David 0. Sears, College Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influences of a Narrow Data Base on Social
Psychology's View of Human Nature, 51 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 515 (1986).
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